Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law

Anthony Niblett

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2013, vol. 42, issue 2, 303 - 330

Abstract: This paper presents a model of judging, illustrating how case law evolves when two types of judges with different policy preferences decide cases narrowly. The model shows that case law is unlikely to reflect the midpoint of the judges' ideal points. The result challenges the conventional wisdom suggesting that balancing ideologically extreme judges will likely yield moderate laws. The model suggests that a centrist executive faced with a sitting extreme left-wing judge should appoint a moderate judge rather than an extreme right-wing judge.

Date: 2013
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