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Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods?

Edward Glaeser and Cass Sunstein

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2014, vol. 43, issue 1, 65 - 93

Abstract: According to a standard principle in free-speech law, the remedy for falsehoods is more speech, not enforced silence. But empirical research demonstrates that corrections of falsehoods can backfire, by increasing people's commitment to their inaccurate beliefs, and that presentation of balanced information can promote polarization, thus increasing preexisting social divisions. We attempt to explain these apparently puzzling phenomena by reference to what we call asymmetric Bayesianism: purported corrections may be taken to establish the truth of the proposition that is being denied, and the same information can have diametrically opposite effects if those who receive it have opposing antecedent convictions. We also show that the same information can activate radically different memories and associated convictions, thus producing polarized responses to that information, or what we call a memory boomerang. These explanations help account for the potential influence of surprising validators.

Date: 2014
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/675247