Constitutional Folk Theories as a Guide to Constitutional Values? The Case of the Legislative Veto
Edward H. Stiglitz
The Journal of Legal Studies, 2019, vol. 48, issue 1, 45 - 79
Abstract values often motivate doctrines in important areas of constitutional law. A jurist favors one doctrinal position over another because, under some implicit positive theory, it promotes a consequential value, such as liberty or democratic values. Yet this jurisprudential posture falters if theory is incomplete or inapt. As an object lesson into the perils of incomplete functionalism, I consider the relationship between the so-called unitary executive and democratic values. I acknowledge a theoretical account of the unitary executive along the lines of the one that animates judicial decisions; I then argue that, viewed in a more complete setting, judicial decisions seemingly promoting a unitary executive may engender pluralism and undermine the value of accountability. A state-level empirical analysis of this issue questions the soundness of democratic values as a motivation for pursuing a unitary executive. I conclude with thoughts on the role of courts in managing functionalist constitutional values.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/702711
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in The Journal of Legal Studies from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().