EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Classical Liberal Property and the Question of Institutional Choice

Thomas W. Merrill

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2021, vol. 50, issue S2, S9 - S25

Abstract: Richard Epstein’s property scholarship tracks his classical liberal theory of government. The classical liberal would permit state intervention to overcome collective-action problems but not to engage in redistribution of wealth. With respect to private law, Epstein harbors no clear preference for either the legislature or the courts as a source of limits on owners’ autonomy to overcome collective-action problems. With regard to public law, in contrast, Epstein would elevate the courts to a superior status relative to legislatures and would have courts enforce the classical liberal ideal as a matter of constitutional law. This article questions whether giving such power to courts makes sense, even on classical liberal assumptions.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/704894 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/704894 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/704894

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Legal Studies from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().

 
Page updated 2022-03-29
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/704894