Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension

Lucian Bebchuk () and Louis Kaplow

The Journal of Legal Studies, 1992, vol. 21, issue 2, 365-70

Date: 1992
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Working Paper: Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:21:y:1992:i:2:p:365-70

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