Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making

Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich and Amos Tversky

The Journal of Legal Studies, 1996, vol. 25, issue 2, 287-318

Abstract: Classical theories of choice associate with each option a unique value such that, given an offered set, the decision maker chooses the option of highest value. An immediate consequence is context-independence: the relative ranking of any two options should not vary with the presence or absence of other options. Five experiments reveal two systematic violations of context-independence in legal decision making: the same option is evaluated more favorably when it is intermediate rather than extreme in the offered set (compromise), and the same option is evaluated more favorably in the presence of a similar option that is clearly inferior to it (contrast). Prescriptive implications of context-dependence in legal decision making are discussed. Copyright 1996 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1996
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