Using Lotteries to Expand the Range of Litigation Settlements

James D Miller

The Journal of Legal Studies, 1997, vol. 26, issue 1, 69-94

Abstract: This article shows that a testable implication of many game theoretic models of litigation is that litigating parties should incorporate lotteries into their settlement aggrements. The article focuses on how litigating parties could use lotteries to overcome problems caused by asymmetric information. Also discussed is why mutually optimistic parties would have incentives to use lotteries even if their use would make the parties worse off. The article briefly explores why decision makers would benefit from using lotteries in situations involving plea bargains, child custody disputes, and the application of the exclusionary rule. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:69-94

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