Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective

Bruce L Hay and Kathryn E Spier

The Journal of Legal Studies, 1997, vol. 26, issue 2, 413-31

Abstract: Burden of proof rules, which require a specified party to produce evidence on a contested issue, are central to the adversary system. In this article, we model burden of proof rules as a device for minimizing the costs of litigation. The central point to emerge from the model is that, properly assigned, a burden of proof rule economizes on the transmission of information to the court. We use the model to explain characteristic practices of courts in assigning the burden of proof. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/468002 (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:413-31

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Legal Studies from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().