Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups

Saul Levmore

The Journal of Legal Studies, 1999, vol. 28, issue 2, 259-81

Abstract: This paper offers the conjecture that interest groups act where there are cycling majorities or other aggregation anomalies. The claim is that instability attracts political activity. This simple conjecture suggests a link between voting paradoxes, or puzzles of aggregation, and questions about why some interest groups succeed while others do not. Interest groups are seen as exploiting the opportunities offered by aggregation anomalies either by influencing procedure or by bargaining their way into successful coalitions. The link between instability and interest-group activity also bears on such normative questions as whether interest-group activity is likely to have disparate corrupting influences on legislative or judicial or direct (popular) decision making. Copyright 1999 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:259-81

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