Dworkin's Two Conceptions of Rights

Richard H Pildes

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2000, vol. 29, issue 1, 309-15

Abstract: This brief reply redefends the view that two distinct conceptions of the justification and structure of constitutional rights can be found in constitutional theory, political philosophy, and the discourse of constitutional adjudication. The first is labeled the immunities conception; the second is characterized as the structural or reason-restraining conception of rights. This reply also defends the common association of Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously with the immunities view, while recognizing that multiple conceptions of the justifications and structure of rights can be found in Dworkin's corpus of writings. Copyright 2000 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/468073 (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:309-15

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Legal Studies from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().