Evolution of the Common Law and the Emergence of Compromise

Douglas Glen Whitman

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2000, vol. 29, issue 2, 753-81

Abstract: In a system of judge-made law, each judge who decides a case in a particular area of law may, in principle, choose to depart from precedent in favor of another rule. This paper examines the question of whether such a system will produce constant oscillation among different legal rules or will instead produce a single rule that potential litigants can rely upon when choosing their behavior. Using a model of the legal process that treats judges as self-interested agents maximizing their private and reputation-based utility, this article derives conditions under which the common-law process will produce convergence on a single rule rather than oscillation between rules. The article also examines the circumstances in which the introduction of a compromise rule can resolve a problem of oscillation between rules. Copyright 2000 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:753-81

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