Efficient Time Bars: A New Rationale for the Existence of Statutes of Limitations in Criminal Law

Yair Listokin

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2002, vol. 31, issue 1, 99-118

Abstract: This paper proposes a novel normative economic explanation for statutes of limitations for criminal offenses. Because potential criminals tend to discount the future at higher rates than society, punishing crimes long after they are committed will be inefficient. Punishments after a long lag have only a nominal deterrent effect, while they may cost society substantial sums. The model presented in the paper derives the optimal statute of limitations for a crime by modifying the standard model of public enforcement of law to consider lags between crime and punishment. In addition, numerical simulations of the model suggest that some U.S. statutes of limitations are generally consistent with optimal limitations (probably serendipitously). Finally, the paper employs the model to critique several tenets of the law concerning statutes of limitations. Copyright 2002 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/339290 (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:31:y:2002:i:1:p:99-118

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Legal Studies from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().