Contingent Fees, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents: A Laboratory Experiment

Michael McKee, Rudy Santore and Joel Shelton

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2007, vol. 36, issue 2, 253-273

Abstract: When attorney effort is not verifiable, previous theoretical work has found that a competitive legal services market may yield an equilibrium contingent fee that is strictly greater than the zero-profit contingent fee. However, these results require fairly sophisticated consumers who recognize that lower contingent fees do not induce sufficient attorney effort. This paper reports on tests of these predictions in an experimental setting.

Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:36:y:2007:p:253-273

DOI: 10.1086/511897

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