Regulation of International Trade in the United States: The Tokyo Round
The Journal of Business, 1987, vol. 60, issue 2, 297-306
A model based on the economic theory of regulation is used to explain the interindustry pattern of tariff protection that emerged from the Tokyo Round. Although tariff reductions were modest and were conducted in large part using a harmonization tariff-cutting formula, evidence reported here suggests that domestic pressure groups were able to exercise influence over post-Tokyo Round tariff levels. Results of this analysis provide support for the Marvel-Ray tariff formation model. Copyright 1987 by the University of Chicago.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:60:y:1987:i:2:p:297-306
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