Compensation, Turnover, and Top Management Incentives: Historical Evidence

Charles J Hadlock and Gerald B Lumer

The Journal of Business, 1997, vol. 70, issue 2, 153-87

Abstract: The authors find that the rate of top management turnover and the sensitivity of turnover to stock returns for a sample of large industrial firms from 1933 to 1941 was significantly smaller than estimates reported for modern panels. They present evidence that management compensation has become more sensitive to firm performance since the 1930s. In contrast to the conclusions of Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990) and others, the authors' findings indicate that management incentives under control of the board have become stronger rather than weaker over the past half century. These findings are consistent with internal and external control mechanisms functioning as complements. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1997
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