Information, Nonexcludability, and Financial Market Structure
Bharat Anand and
The Journal of Business, 2000, vol. 73, issue 3, 357-402
We study the determinants of market structure in financial intermediation markets when property rights over information are weak. We show that incentives to gather information to screen firms can be preserved in decentralized markets with more than one intermediary. Local monopoly power is sustained by an aggregate oligopolistic market structure, where intermediaries voluntarily refrain from free riding. We find that this market structure is robust to entry and does not change with market size. We apply our theory to two markets--investment banking and venture capital--and use it to organize and interpret the evidence. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/209647 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:73:y:2000:i:3:p:357-402
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in The Journal of Business from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().