Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation

David Becher, Terry L. Campbell and Melissa B. Frye
Additional contact information
Terry L. Campbell: University of Delaware
Melissa B. Frye: University of Central Florida

The Journal of Business, 2005, vol. 78, issue 5, 1753-1778

Abstract: Although deregulation leads to changes in the duties of boards of directors, little is known about changes in their incentives. U.S. banking deregulation and associated changes during the 1990s lends itself to a natural experiment. These industry shocks forced bank directors to face expanded opportunities, increased competition, and an expanding market for corporate control. While bank directors received significantly less equity-based compensation throughout most of the 1990s, by 1999, their use of such compensation is indistinguishable from a matched sample of industrial firms. Our results suggest firms respond to deregulation by improving internal monitoring through aligning directors' and shareholders' incentives.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/431441 main text (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Incentive compensation for bank directors: the impact of deregulation (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:78:y:2005:i:5:p:1753-1778

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Business from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().