Bundling, Entry Deterrence, and Specialist Innovators

Jay Choi and Christodoulos Stefanadis

The Journal of Business, 2006, vol. 79, issue 5, 2575-2594

Abstract: We examine a mechanism by which bundling may inefficiently deter entry into the market. The model considers an incumbent monopolist in two complementary components that faces a series of entry attempts by rivals. It is shown that the incumbent can practice bundling to buttress its monopoly position by keeping specialist innovators out of the market. Bundling prevents specialist rivals from coordinating in the dynamic entry process, reducing the probability of an eventual displacement of the incumbent. The specialization decisions of rivals are also distorted. Bundling may lead to lower customer and total economic welfare.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:79:y:2006:i:5:p:2575-2594

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