Factions and Political Competition

Nicola Persico, Jose Carlos Rodriguez-Pueblita and Dan Silverman

Journal of Political Economy, 2011, vol. 119, issue 2, 242 - 288

Abstract: This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Factions and Political Competition (2007)
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