Liquidity and the Threat of Fraudulent Assets

Yiting Li (), Guillaume Rocheteau and Pierre-Olivier Weill

Journal of Political Economy, 2012, vol. 120, issue 5, 000 - 000

Abstract: We study an over-the-counter (OTC) market in which the usefulness of assets as a means of payment or collateral is limited by the threat of fraudulent practices. Agents can produce fraudulent assets at a positive cost, which generates upper bounds on the quantity of each asset that can be traded in the OTC market. Each of these endogenous, asset-specific, resalability constraints depends on the cost of fraud, on the frequency of trade, and on the asset price. In equilibrium, assets are partitioned into three liquidity tiers, which differ in their resalability, prices, haircuts, sensitivity to shocks, and responses to policies.

Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: Liquidity and the threat of fraudulent assets (2011)
Working Paper: Liquidity and the Threat of Fraudulent Assets (2011)
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