Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing

Timothy Cason and Charles Plott ()

Journal of Political Economy, 2014, vol. 122, issue 6, 1235 - 1270

Abstract: This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.

Date: 2014
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