Strategic Mass Killings

Joan Esteban (), Massimo Morelli () and Dominic Rohner

Journal of Political Economy, 2015, vol. 123, issue 5, 1087 - 1132

Abstract: We provide a model of conflict and mass killing decisions to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur. We predict that mass killings are most likely in countries with large amounts of natural resource rents, polarization, institutional constraints regarding rent sharing, and low productivity of labor. The role of resources such as oil, gas, and diamonds and other key determinants of mass killings is confirmed by our empirical results based on country-level as well as ethnic group-level analysis.

Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Mass Killings (2010)
Working Paper: Strategic Mass Killings (2010)
Working Paper: Strategic Mass Killings (2010)
Working Paper: Strategic Mass Killings (2010)
Working Paper: Strategic mass killings (2010)
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