Teamwork and Moral Hazard: Evidence from the Emergency Department

David C. Chan

Journal of Political Economy, 2016, vol. 124, issue 3, 734 - 770

Abstract: I investigate how teamwork may reduce moral hazard by joint monitoring and management. I study two organizational systems differing in the extent to which physicians may mutually manage work: Physicians are assigned patients in a “nurse-managed” system but divide patients between themselves in a “self-managed” system. The self-managed system increases throughput productivity by reducing a “foot-dragging” moral hazard, in which physicians prolong patient stays as expected future work increases. I find evidence that physicians in the same location have better information about each other and that, in the self-managed system, they use this information to assign patients.

Date: 2016
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