Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition

Itai Ashlagi, Yash Kanoria and Jacob D. Leshno

Journal of Political Economy, 2017, vol. 125, issue 1, 69 - 98

Abstract: We study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side. First, we show that even the slightest imbalance yields an essentially unique stable matching. Second, we give a tight description of stable outcomes, showing that matching markets are extremely competitive. Each agent on the short side of the market is matched with one of his top choices, and each agent on the long side either is unmatched or does almost no better than being matched with a random partner. Our results suggest that any matching market is likely to have a small core, explaining why small cores are empirically ubiquitous.

Date: 2017
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