Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power

Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Frederic Malherbe

Journal of Political Economy, 2018, vol. 126, issue 1, 107 - 149

Abstract: We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and (ii) ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations.

Date: 2018
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