On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo

Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra

Journal of Political Economy, 2020, vol. 128, issue 1, 32 - 74

Abstract: A positive demand shock for coltan, a mineral whose bulky output cannot be concealed, leads armed actors to create illicit customs and provide protection at coltan mines, where they settle as “stationary bandits.” A similar shock for gold, easy to conceal, leads to stationary bandits in the villages where income from gold is spent, where they introduce illicit mining visas, taxes, and administrations. Having a stationary bandit from a militia or the Congolese army increases welfare. These findings suggest that armed actors may create “essential functions of a state” to better expropriate, which, depending on their goals, can increase welfare.

Date: 2020
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