On Information Design in Games

Laurent Mathevet, Jacopo Perego and Ina Taneva ()

Journal of Political Economy, 2020, vol. 128, issue 4, 1370 - 1404

Abstract: Information provision in games influences behavior by affecting agents’ beliefs about the state as well as their higher-order beliefs. We first characterize the extent to which a designer can manipulate agents’ beliefs by disclosing information. We then describe the structure of optimal belief distributions, including a concave-envelope representation that subsumes the single-agent result of Kamenica and Gentzkow. This result holds under various solution concepts and outcome selection rules. Finally, we use our approach to compute an optimal information structure in an investment game under adversarial equilibrium selection.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/705332 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/705332 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/705332

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().