A Model of Fickle Capital Flows and Retrenchment

Ricardo Caballero () and Alp Simsek

Journal of Political Economy, 2020, vol. 128, issue 6, 2288 - 2328

Abstract: We develop a model of gross capital flows and analyze their role in global financial stability. In our model, consistent with the data, when a country experiences asset fire sales, foreign investments exit (fickleness), while domestic investments abroad return home (retrenchment). When countries have symmetric expected returns and financial development, the benefits of retrenchment dominate the costs of fickleness and gross flows increase fire-sale prices. Fickleness, however, creates a coordination problem since it encourages local policy makers to restrict capital inflows. When countries are asymmetric, capital flows are driven by additional mechanisms—reach for safety and reach for yield—that can destabilize the receiving country.

Date: 2020
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Model of Fickle Capital Flows and Retrenchment (2019)
Working Paper: A Model of Fickle Capital Flows and Retrenchment (2016)
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