Parent-Child Information Frictions and Human Capital Investment: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Peter Bergman

Journal of Political Economy, 2021, vol. 129, issue 1, 286 - 322

Abstract: This paper studies information frictions between parents and children and their effect on human capital investments. I provide biweekly information to a random sample of parents about their child’s missed assignments. Parents have upwardly biased beliefs about their child’s effort. Providing information attenuates this bias and improves student achievement. Using data from the experiment, I estimate a persuasion game between parents and their children that shows that the treatment effect is due to more accurate beliefs and reduced monitoring costs. Policy simulations from the model demonstrate that improving school reporting or providing more information to parents can increase learning at low cost.

Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Parent-Child Information Frictions and Human Capital Investment: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2015)
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