Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy and Omer Tamuz

Journal of Political Economy, 2021, vol. 129, issue 9, 2546 - 2594

Abstract: We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. For two agents, we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann’s agreement theorem and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions from a 1995 work by Dawid and colleagues. For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a “no-trade” condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.

Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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