Cooperative Property Rights and Development: Evidence from Land Reform in El Salvador

Eduardo Montero

Journal of Political Economy, 2022, vol. 130, issue 1, 48 - 93

Abstract: In cooperative property rights systems, workers jointly own and manage production, whereas in outside-ownership systems, an owner contracts workers. Despite a rich literature on how the allocation of property rights matters for specialization, efficiency, and equity, little causal evidence exists. During a land reform in El Salvador in 1980, the military government reorganized properties owned by individuals with cumulative landholdings over 500 hectares into cooperatives; properties below this threshold remained as outside-owned properties. Using the discontinuous probability of cooperative formation, I provide evidence on the effects of cooperative property rights relative to outside ownership on specialization, productivity, and worker equity.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/717042 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/717042 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/717042

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().