Intermediation and Competition in Search Markets: An Empirical Case Study

Tobias Salz

Journal of Political Economy, 2022, vol. 130, issue 2, 310 - 345

Abstract: Intermediaries in decentralized markets can affect buyer welfare both directly, by reducing expenses for buyers with high search cost, and indirectly, through a search externality that affects the prices paid by buyers who do not use intermediaries. I investigate the magnitude of these effects in New York City’s trade-waste market, where buyers can search either by themselves or through a waste broker. Combining elements from the empirical search and procurement auction literatures, I construct and estimate a model for a decentralized market. Results from the model show that intermediaries improve welfare and benefit buyers in both the broker and the search markets.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/717349 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/717349 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/717349

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().