The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice

Monique De Haan, Pieter Gautier, Hessel Oosterbeek and Bas van der Klaauw

Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 131, issue 2, 388 - 455

Abstract: We use a unique combination of register and survey data from Amsterdam to investigate the performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice. We find that deferred acceptance (DA) results in higher mean welfare than the adaptive Boston mechanism. This is due to students making strategic mistakes. The welfare gain of a switch from actual Boston to DA is over 90% of the welfare difference between actual Boston and optimal (proxy) Boston. Disadvantaged and lower-ability students would benefit most from such a switch.

Date: 2023
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Related works:
Working Paper: The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice (2015)
Working Paper: The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice (2015)
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