Partial Default

Cristina Arellano, Xavier Mateos-Planas and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull

Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 131, issue 6, 1385 - 1439

Abstract: We document that countries partially default often and with varying intensity, resulting in lengthy episodes and hump-shaped patterns for partial default and debt. Default episodes lead to haircuts for lenders but not to reductions in debt, because the defaulted debt accumulates and borrowing continues. We present a theory of partial default rationalizing these patterns and the heterogeneity of partial default, and partial default’s comovements with spreads, debt, and output that are absent in standard sovereign default theory. We include policy counterfactuals in the form of pari passu and no-dilution clauses and debt-relief policies, and their welfare implications.

Date: 2023
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