Disability Insurance Income Saves Lives

Alexander Gelber, Timothy Moore, Zhuan Pei and Alexander Strand

Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 131, issue 11, 3156 - 3185

Abstract: We show that higher payments from US Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) reduce mortality. Using administrative data on new DI beneficiaries, we exploit discontinuities in the benefit formula through a regression kink design. We estimate that $1,000 more in annual DI payments decreases the annual mortality rate of lower-income beneficiaries by approximately 0.18–0.35 percentage points, implying an elasticity of mortality with respect to DI income of around −0.6 to −1.0. We find no robust evidence of an effect of DI income on the mortality of higher-income beneficiaries.

Date: 2023
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