Market Segmentation and Competition in Health Insurance

Michael J. Dickstein, Kate Ho and Nathaniel Mark

Journal of Political Economy, 2024, vol. 132, issue 1, 96 - 148

Abstract: In the United States, households obtain health insurance through distinct market segments. To explore the economics of this segmentation, we consider the effects of pooling coverage provided through small employers and through individual marketplaces. We model households’ demand for insurance and health care along with insurers’ price setting to predict equilibrium choices and premiums. Applying our model to data from Oregon, we find that pooling can mitigate adverse selection in the individual market and benefit small group households without raising taxpayer costs. Our estimates provide insight into the effects of new regulations that allow employers to shift coverage to individual marketplaces.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/725707 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/725707 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/725707

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().