Private Monopoly and Restricted Entry—Evidence from the Notary Profession

Frank Verboven and Biliana Yontcheva

Journal of Political Economy, 2024, vol. 132, issue 11, 3658 - 3707

Abstract: We study entry restrictions in a private monopoly: the Latin notary system. Under this widespread system, the state grants notaries exclusive rights to certify important economic transactions, including real estate. To uncover the current policy goals behind the geographic entry restrictions, we develop an empirical entry model that incorporates a spatial demand model and a multioutput production model. We find that the entry restrictions serve primarily producer interests and give only a small weight to consumer surplus. We show how reform would generate considerable welfare improvements and imply a substantial redistribution toward consumers without threatening geographic coverage.

Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Private Monopoly and Restricted Entry - Evidence from the Notary Profession (2022)
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