Why Do Couples and Singles Save during Retirement? Household Heterogeneity and Its Aggregate Implications

Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, John Jones and Rory McGee

Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 133, issue 3, 750 - 792

Abstract: We estimate a model of savings for retired couples and singles who face longevity and medical expense risks and in which couples can leave bequests both when the first spouse dies and when the last spouse dies. We show that saving motives vary by marital status, permanent income, and age. We find that most households save more for medical expenses than for bequests but that richer households and couples, who hold most of the wealth, save more for bequests. As a result, bequest motives are a key determinant of aggregate retirement wealth.

Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Why Do Couples and Singles Save during Retirement? Household Heterogeneity and its Aggregate Implications (2023)
Working Paper: Why Do Couples and Singles Save during Retirement? Household Heterogeneity and its Aggregate Implications (2021)
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