Persuasion with Multiple Actions

Davit Khantadze, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 133, issue 5, 1497 - 1526

Abstract: We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple receivers take one action each. We compare simultaneous procedures with sequential ones. In a simultaneous procedure, all the receivers act simultaneously following the realization of a single public signal. In a sequential procedure, receivers receive information and take actions sequentially. We characterize the conditions under which the optimal sequential procedure leads to a higher payoff and characterize the optimal ordering of actions.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/734125 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/734125 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/734125

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().