Market Structure, Investment, and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications

Jonathan T. Elliott, Georges V. Houngbonon, Marc Ivaldi and Paul T. Scott

Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 133, issue 5, 1401 - 1459

Abstract: We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructure among mobile network operators. Although consolidation increases market power, it can lead to more efficient data transmission due to economies of scale, which we derive from physical principles. After estimating our model with French consumer and infrastructure data, equilibrium simulations reveal that while prices decrease with the number of firms, so do download speeds. Our framework also allows us to quantify the impact of spectrum allocation. The marginal social value of spectrum exceeds firms’ willingness to pay in our model as well as observed prices in spectrum auctions.

Date: 2025
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