Misconduct and Reputation under Imperfect Information

Francis Annan

Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 133, issue 5, 1460 - 1496

Abstract: Misconduct—market actions that are unethical and indicative of fraud—is a significant yet poorly understood issue that underlies many economic transactions. We design a field experiment to study the impact of two-sided antimisconduct information programs, which we deploy on the local markets for mobile money (“human ATMs”) in Ghana. The programs lead to a large reduction in misconduct (−21⁢ percentage points=−72%) and, as a result, broader improvements in overall market activity, consumer welfare, and firm revenue. We show the treatment effect is due to a combination of more accurate consumer beliefs about misconduct and increased vendor reputation concerns.

Date: 2025
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