Making Information More Valuable

Mark Whitmeyer

Journal of Political Economy, 2026, vol. 134, issue 3, 978 - 1016

Abstract: We study what changes to an agent’s decision problem increase her value for information. We prove that information becomes more valuable if and only if the agent’s reduced-form payoff in her belief becomes more convex. When the transformation corresponds to the addition of an action, the requisite increase in convexity occurs if and only if a simple geometric condition holds, which extends in a natural way to the addition of multiple actions. We apply these findings to two scenarios: a monopolistic screening problem in which the good is information and delegation with information acquisition.

Date: 2026
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