Private Private Information

Kevin He, Fedor Sandomirskiy and Omer Tamuz

Journal of Political Economy, 2026, vol. 134, issue 5, 1561 - 1606

Abstract: Private signals model noisy information about an unknown state. Although these signals are called private, they may still carry information about each other. Our paper introduces the concept of private private signals, which contain information about the state but not about other signals. To achieve privacy, signal quality may need to be sacrificed. We study the informativeness of private private signals and characterize those that are optimal in the sense that they cannot be made more informative without violating privacy. We discuss implications for privacy in recommendation systems, information design, causal inference, and mechanism design.

Date: 2026
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