Quadratic Social Welfare Functions

Larry Epstein and Uzi Segal

Journal of Political Economy, 1992, vol. 100, issue 4, 691-712

Abstract: John Harsanyi has provided an intriguing argument that social welfare can be expressed as a weighted sum of individual utilities. His theorem has been criticized on the grounds that a central axiom, that social preference satisfies the independence axiom, has the morally unacceptable implication that the process of choice and considerations of ex ante fairness are of no importance. This paper presents a variation of Harsanyi's theorem in which the axioms are compatible with a concern for ex ante fairness. The implied mathematical form for social welfare is a strictly quasi-concave and quadratic function of individual utilities. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1992
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