Peer Pressure and Partnerships
Eugene Kandel () and
Journal of Political Economy, 1992, vol. 100, issue 4, 801-17
Partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie. But in organizations of any significant size, the free-rider effects would seem to choke off any motivational forces. This analysis explores how peer pressure operates and how factors such as profit sharing, shame, guilt, norms, mutual monitoring, and empathy interact to create incentives in the firm. The argument that Japanese firms enjoy team spirit because compensation is linked to overall profitability is analyzed. An explanation for the prevalence of partnerships among individuals in similar occupations is provided. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.
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Working Paper: Peer Pressure and Partnerships (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:100:y:1992:i:4:p:801-17
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