Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market

Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak

Journal of Political Economy, 1993, vol. 101, issue 6, 988-1010

Abstract: This paper introduces the 'separate spheres' bargaining model, a new model of distribution within marriage. It differs from divorce threat bargaining models in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage; this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles. The predictions of the authors' model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models; in the separate spheres model, cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can--but need not--imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages. In the long run, the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1993
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Related works:
Working Paper: Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1991)
Working Paper: Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1991)
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