Social Attributes and Strategic Equilibrium: A Restaurant Pricing Game

Edi Karni and Dan Levin ()

Journal of Political Economy, 1994, vol. 102, issue 4, 822-40

Abstract: Using a game-theoretic approach, the authors examine possible equilibrium explanations of the often-observed phenomenon that two neighboring restaurants offering similar menus nevertheless experience vastly different demands. The essential aspect of this analysis is the presence of a consumption externality that makes the popularity itself a factor in the determination of the relative attractiveness of the restaurants. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1994
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