Learning, Wage Dynamics, and Firm-Specific Human Capital

Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris

Journal of Political Economy, 1996, vol. 104, issue 4, 838-68

Abstract: The authors introduce a dynamic and fully strategic model of wage determination in the presence of firm-specific human capital. In this model, human capital is interpreted as information. The authors show that equilibrium exists and is efficient and that it gives rise to a unique distribution of the social surplus. They show further that the equilibrium wage is determined by three factors. Consideration of these factors allows the authors to determine when and how the market mechanism enables the worker to capture some of the returns to firm-specific human capital. They relate their findings to the ongoing empirical debate concerning the return to tenure. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1996
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (79)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/262044 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:104:y:1996:i:4:p:838-68

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division (pubtech@press.uchicago.edu).