Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment

Antonio Merlo

Journal of Political Economy, 1997, vol. 105, issue 1, 101-31

Abstract: In this paper, the author structurally estimates a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy and he conducts policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. The author shows that the model fits data on the duration of negotiations and government durations in postwar Italy well. Also, he shows that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotiations or government durations, whereas the imposition of a strict deadline would in general reduce the incentives to delay agreement as well as government durations. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1997
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment (1996)
Working Paper: Bargaining Over Governments in a Stochastic Environment (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:105:y:1997:i:1:p:101-31

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