Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible?

Ronald G Cummings, Steven Elliott, Glenn Harrison and James Murphy

Journal of Political Economy, 1997, vol. 105, issue 3, 609-21

Abstract: Hypothetical referenda have been proposed as an incentive-compatible mechanism that can be used to obtain social valuations of environmental resources. The authors employ experimental methods to test the hypothesis that such referenda are indeed incentive compatible. Their results lead them to reject that hypothesis. Coauthors are Steven Elliott, Glenn W. Harrison, and James Murphy. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1997
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